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ABSTRACT 
Previous work in this area has analyzed research and 
development as a stochastic racing game where the strategy is the rate 
of investment on the innovation, conditional on no success to date. 
This paper generalizes this work in several ways; first, we use a more 
general hazard function, although we retain the assumption that it 
depends only upon current investment. We find that when patent 
protection is perfect, equilibrium investment rates are monotonically 
increasing over time. Second, we allow for the possibility that some 
firms are currently receiving profits from the sale of a product which 
will be replaced by the innovation. This allows us to determine 
whether current industry leaders will tend to be more or less 
innovative than firms with smaller current market shares. We find 
that, in a stationary equilibrium, current industry leaders will tend 
to invest at a lower rate than those firms which currently have 
smaller market shares. We also remark that a stationary equilibrium 
implies that the random success date follows an exponential 
distribution, an assumption which is ubiquitous in the earlier 
theoretical work on this subject. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WITH A GENERALIZED HAZARD FUNCTION 
Jennifer F. Reinganum 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to serve primarily as a technical 
appendix for recent work by Loury (1979) , Lee and Wilde (1980) , 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , Feichtinger (1981) and Reinganum 
(1981,1982) . These papers analyze research and development as a 
stochastic racing game where the strategy is the rate of investment on 
the innovation. In the first three papers, this rate is assumed to be 
constant, resulting in an exponentially-distributed waiting time for 
the innovation. The last two authors have allowed time and/or state 
dependence of the strategies, but have assumed specific functional 
forms for the hazard function, or conditional density of success. The 
most important feature of these hazard functions is that they depend 
only upon current investment, and not upon accumulated previous 
investment. Reinganum provides an extended example, while Feichtinger 
assumes convex costs (equivalently, a concave hazard function), and 
computes and analyzes via a phase diagram an example with a constant 
elasticity cost function. Both find that, when the planning horizon 
is finite, in equilibrium firms will invest in R and D at an 
increasing rate over time, and will consequently experience an 
increasing hazard rate over time. That is, given no success to date, 
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each firm will be increasingly likely to succeed in the next time 
increment. When the planning horizon is infinite and the (potential) 
market for the innovation is stationary, then a constant rate of 
investment is consistent with equilibrium behavior. Constancy of the 
investment rate implies an exponentially-distributed waiting time. 
Thus under the aforementioned circumstances the commonly-made 
assumption of an exponentially-distributed waiting time will actually 
be a consequence of equilibrium behavior in a somewhat more general 
setting. 
This paper generalizes previous work in several ways; first, 
we allow the hazard function to have an initial region of increasing 
returns, although we retain the restriction that the hazard rate 
depends only upon current investment. We find that when patent 
protection is perfect (as assumed in Reinganum (1981) and Feichtinger 
(1981) ), equilibrium investment rates are monotonically increasing 
over time. Thus the results from these extended examples hold true 
more generally, so long as the hazard function depends only upon 
current investment (and for finite time horizons). When firms suffer 
immediate imitation, at most one firm may invest at a decreasing rate 
and then only for small t; near the terminal date, both must invest at 
an increasing rate. If firms are identical and the equilibrium is 
symmetric, then both must invest at an increasing rate over time. 
Thus the results of these extended examples are robust to more general 
formulations if the hazard function depends upon current investment 
only. This suggests that it is particularly important to attempt to 
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include accumulated expenditure in the hazard function, to see if this 
result may be reversed under more general circumstances. (This 
generalization, while desirable, makes it impossible to use two-
dimensional phase diagrammatic analysis and is beyond the scope of 
this paper). Second, we allow for the possibility that some firms are 
currently receiving profits from the sale of a product which will be 
replaced by the innovation. This allows us to determine whether 
current industry leaders will tend to be more or less innovative than 
firms with smaller current market shares. While we cannot make 
general conclusions on this question, for firms which are identical 
except for their current revenue flows, and in a stationary 
equilibrium, we find that the higher the current rate of revenue, the 
lower is the equilibrium rate of investment on the new product. That 
is, current industry leaders will tend to be less innovative than 
firms which currently have relatively small market shares. Finally, 
we conduct some analysis for an arbitrary finite number of firms; 
however, eventually we restrict ourselves to two firms in order to 
follow Feichtinger's use of phase diagrams to perform detailed 
analysis of the equilibrium paths. 
II. The Model 
A key technological assumption in models of research and 
development is that invention is uncertain; investment in R and D is 
only stochastically related to the date of success. That is, a firm 
can stochastically hasten its date of invention by increasing its rate 
of investment, but it can never guarantee itself a particular success 
date. 
Let �i denote firm i's date of invention, with probability 
distribution Fi (t) = Pr{�i � t}. Define the state variable for i 
xi (t) = 1 - Fi (t), and the control variable for i ui (t); ui (t)
represents firm i's rate of investment at date t. The state and 
control variables are related by the hazard function hi(ui): 
or 
F. (t)/(l - F. (t)) 1 1 hi Cui Ct», 
xi(t) - hi (ui (t))xi (t).
Assumption 1. The function hi(") is assumed to satisfy 
(a) 
(b) 
and 
(c) 
'' 
hi (0) 0, 
h '. Cu.> > o 1 1 
lim hi(ui) ui 
-7
"' 
Mi 
for all u. e [0,m), lim h '. Cu.> 1 u. -7"' 1 1 1 
there exists .J!i < "' such that 
hi Cui) 2 Ci) 0 as ui � (2) .J!i• 
0 
Thus we assume that no progress is made without a commitment 
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uf resources, and a greater investment results in a higher conditional 
density over the success date, but a very high investment rate yields 
only a finite hazard rate. We allow for an initial region of 
increasing returns, but eventually the firm experiences a declining 
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marginal return to increased investment. Previous models have assumed 
convex cost functions (or, equivalently, concave production functions 
hi(")) of the constant elasticity class (see, e. g. , Feichtinger
(1981), Reinganum (1981), (1982)). 
Let Pij denote the value of j's success to firm i. That 
is,
-r.t 
firm i receives (in present value terms) e 1 P .. if firm j succeeds 1J 
at t, j = 1,2, • • •  ,n. Thus patent protection need not be perfect, but 
suppose that P .. 2 P . . •  Let R. denote flow profits to firm i which11 1J 1 
are received so long as no firm has completed the innovation. Thus 
the firms may be operating currently in a market which will be 
affected by the successful development of the innovation. (In 
previous models, Ri has always been assumed to be zero). Suppose
P .. 2 R./r . • The inclusion of this pre-innovation revenue term allows 11 1 1 
us to assess the impact of current market power upon the incentive to 
invest in research and development. 
Then the value of firm i's profits can be written 
vi(u)
where 
IT -r.te 1 Ilx.. J 0 J C[ hj(u.)P .. + R. - u.]dtJ J 1J 1 1 
x. J h. (u.)x. , x. ( 0) = 
1, x. (T) 2. 0, j J J J J J 
(1) 
1.2,, • • •  ,,n. 
Notice that Fi(t) 1 - exp{-Jth.(u.(s))ds} > 0 for all t < m since h. 
0 1 1 1 
is bounded. Thus x.(T) > 0 automatically. This is a consequence of J 
the assumption that hi depends upon current investment ui only. A
more general specification would have hi= hi(ui,xi). While it would 
be desirable to obtain results at this higher level of generality, it 
does not appear to be possible aside from computational examples, 
since the differential equations characterizing the Nash equilibrium 
investment rates will be nonseparable in (x,u) and will therefore be 
impossible to diagram either in state or control space. 
Assumption 2. Suppose that h'. (O) > 1/P . . •1 11 
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· -
Lemma 1. There exists a unique value ui < m such that hi(ui) = 1/Pii;
moreover, Yi < ui. If Pii is the capitalized value of a constant
revenue stream n .. , P .. = n .. /r., then a;./an .. > 0 and a;./ar. < O. 11 11 11 1 1 11 1 1 
Proof. Since h '. (O) > 1/P .. and h'. 'cu.) > O for all u. � u., -- 1 11 1 1 1 -1 
h:(ui) > 1/Pii for all ui E [O,yi]. After yi' h:(ui) is monotonically
decreasing and continuous. Since h'. (u.) > 1/P .. and lim h'. Cu.) = 0, 1 -1 11 -7m 1 1 ui 
there exists a unique value ';i". < m (and > u.) such that h '. C';i".) = O.1 -1 1 1 
Differentiating the equation h'. (;-.)P .. - 1 = h'. C;.)n .. /r. - 1 = 0 and1 1 11 1 1 1 1  1 
solving yields 
and 
a;_/anii 1 
ai./ar. 1 1 
2 , , - r. /( n .. ) h. 1 1 1  1 
1 /nii<c ;i> < o. 
(u.) > 0 1 
III. Strategy Space and Equilibrium Concept
Q. E. D. 
In differential games there are (at least) two alternative 
strategy spaces of interest, corresponding to alternative assumptions 
regarding the information structure and/or players' ability to commit 
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themselves. These are path (or open-loop) strategies and decision rule 
(or closed-loop or feedback) strategies. The distinction is important 
mathematically and economically. The two strategy spaces can lead to 
quite different conclusions and one must be careful to use the most 
appropriate one in applications. However, previous work (Reinganum 
1981,1982) has shown that when the hazard function depends upon 
current investment only, the equilibrium strategies will depend only 
upon time, and not upon the state variables. Thus in this particular 
case, we are justified in considering open-loop or path strategies to 
be the objects of choice. 
Definition 1. Define the set of admissible strategies for i to be 
ui = {ui : [O,T] -7 [O,m) I ui is differentiable} .
Definition 2. Firm i's payoff function is Vi(u) as defined above in
equation (1) • 
A 
Definition 3. A strategy u.(t;u .) SU. is a best response to the1 -1 1 
vector u . = (u.) -�· of rival strategies if -1 J J 1""1 
. A . 
V1Cu1,. ,u. 1,u.,u.+1,. ,u ) 2 V
1Cu1,. ,u. 1,u.,u.+1,. ,u )1- 1 1 n 1- 1 1 n 
for all ui S U i.
Definition 4. A strategy vector (u�)� l E u1 X • •  XU is a Nash1 1= n --
eauilibrium if, for i = 1,2, • • •  ,n, 
• • • • • • • • • 
V1(u1, • •  ,u., • • •  ,u ) 2 V
1Cu1, • • •  ,u. 1,u. ,u.+l' • • •  ,u )
for all u. SU . • 1 1 
1 n 1- 1 1 n 
• A * 
Clearly ui(t) = ui(t; u_i). 
IV. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Play
The behavioral assumption which facilitates characterization 
of the Nash equilibrium is that each firm maximizes its own payoff 
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function, taking the strategies of its rivals as given. In this case, 
firm i chooses u. so as to maximize V
i(u), taking Cu.)-�· (and1 J J 1"" 1 
(x.) -�·> to be arbitrary functions of time subject to the constraint J J1""1 
that u. SU. (and thus x. = exp{- Jth.(u.(s))ds} ). Since x.(T) > 0 J J J o J J 1 
automatically for T < m, we may disregard the constraint that 
xi(T) 2 0. Define the Hamiltonian for firm i
- r.t 
H.(t,A..,x,u) = e
1 [Ilx. [ h.(u.)P .. + R. - u.] - A..h.(u.)x . •1 1 j J J J J 1J 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Since (u.,x.) -�· are functions of time only and are J J J1""1 
i1.sensi tive to choices of ui, we can apply standard optimal control
theory to obtain the following necessary conditions (2)-(5). Let di
9 
denote the Hamiltonian-maximizing value of ui.
and 
aH. 
_1 
au. = e 1 
-r.t , , 1 
Il x.(h.(d.)P . .  - 1) - A..h.(d.) = 0 
j/i 
J 1 1 11 1 1 1 
a
2
H. -rit
n h'.
1
cd.>Pii 
1 _  XJ. 1 1 -2·. - e 
jli aui
A.i<' (di) s. 0 
-aH. 
(2) 
( 3) 
__ _ 1 • 
ax = A. i i 
[ -r.t 
e 1 Il x.(h.(d.)P .. + 'f h.(u.)P . . + R. - d.) 
j/i 
J 1 1 11 J7i J J 1J 1 1 
-A.ihi(di) ]. A.. (T) = 0 1 
xi= - hi(di)xi' xi(O) = 1, xi(T) free. 
( 4) 
( 5) 
Notice that di depends upon (t,A.i) only; xi does not appear. Define 
the maximized Hamiltonian 
-r.t 
H� = e 1 Ilx
j[hi(di)Pii + 'f_ hj(uj)Pij + Ri - di]J71 
- A.i(hi(di)xi.
Since a
2
H�/ax: = 0, the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in x.1 1 1
for given (t,A.i). Therefore the necessary conditions are also
A 
sufficient to determine a best response ui(t;u_i) to the rival
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strategy vector u_i (Arrow and Kurz ( 1970), p. 45, Proposition 6). To 
A A 
find ui' solve equations (4) and (5) jointly for x(t;u_i) and
A A 
A.i(t;u_i). Then ui(t;u_i) can be found by using the relationship
A A 
ui(t;u_i) = di(t,A.i(t;u_i);u_i).
A 
Lemma 2. Firm i' s  best response to (u
j
)
jl=i
' ui(t;u_i) 2 !!.i for all
t. 
Proof. Equations (2) and (3) implicitly define di= di(t,A.i;u_i)
(where the complicated dependence of di upon the rival strategy vector
is just noted by including it in the notation). Then 
A 
ui(.;u_i) = di(.,A.i(.);u_i) is i' s  best response to u_i. Equation (
2)
implies 
-r.t -r.t 
e 1 Il x.P .. - A..= e 1 Il x./h.' (d.).
j/i 
J 11 1 
j/i 
J 1 1 
Since this expression is strictly greater than zero, equation (3) is 
-rt ' '  ' e n x . h. ( d. ) /h. ( d. ) i 0 
j/i 
J 1 1 1 1 
A 
or h'.
1
Cd.) i o. 1 1 Thus di(t,A.i(t);u_i) = ui(t;u_i) 2 !!.i for all t.
Assumption 3 .  Ri 2 !!.i' i = 1,2, • • •  ,n.
Q. E. D. 
Lemma 3. A.i(t) 2 0 for all ti T. If !!.i > 0, then A.i(t) > 0 for all
t < T. 
-r.t Ch'. Cd.)P .. - 1)
From equation (2) , >.. = e 1 fl 1 1 11 Proof. 
r.t 
- e 1 n x. 
1 %. , j�i J h.(d.) 1 1 
). . 1 w.._: [h.(d. ) + h.'(d.>] [� h.(u.)P .. + , 1 1 1 1 . J J 1J R. -h.(d.) J 1 1 1 
Since h�1Cdi) i o. hi(di) 2 hi(!!:i> + h�Cdi)(di - !!:i>.
Thus 
hi(di) + h�(di>[! . hj(uj)Pij + Ri - di]J11 
1 
so 
di] .
2 hi C!!:i> , , [ + hi(di)(di - !!:i) + hi(di) >. h/uj)pij J11 + Ri - di]
hi C!!:i> + h�(di) [>. h/uj)Pij + Ri - !!:i] 2. 0 J11 
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(with strict inequalities if .Jl:i > 0) since Ri 2 !!:i· Then ). . i 0 for 1 
all t. Since >.i(T) = 0, it follows that >.i(t) 2. 0 for all t < T. If
.!!:i > 0, then ).i < O; consequently >.i(T) = 0 implies that ).i(t) > 0 for
all t < T. 
Q. E. D. 
A - A 
Lemma 4. ui(t; u_i) i ui' for all ti T; and ui(T; u_i) = ui.
A -
.!!:i > 0, then ui(t; u_i) < ui for all t < T.
, 
If 
Proof. >.i(T) = 0, so hi(di(T, ).i(T); u_i))Pii - 1 = 0 by equation (2). 
A -
Thus ui(T; u_i) = di(T, >.i(T);u_i) = ui. From equation (1), since 
>.i(t) 2. 0 ().i(t) > 0 if !!:i > 0) by Lemma 3, we see that
, 
hi(di(t,>.i(t); u_i))Pii 2 
1, so
h�(di(t,>.i(t); u_i) 2. 1/Pii 
, , 
, -
hi Cui).
Since hi Cui) i 0 for ui 2. !!:i (and di 2. .!!:i),
A 
ui(t; u_i) = di(t,>.i(t); u_i) i ui.
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If !!:i > 0, then all of the above inequalities are strict for t < T.
Q. E.D. 
Note that equations (2) -(5) must hold simultaneously for all 
firms at a Nash equilibrium u•. Substitute u� into equations (2) -(5) , 1 
differentiate (2) and equate the resulting expression for >.i to that
in equation (4). This yields a system of n first-order nonlinear 
ordinary differential equations in (u�)� 1•J J= 
-h. (u.)u./h.(u.) = h.(u.) L h.(u.)P .. + R. -.. .
.
. . . ' • [\ .  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j J J 1J 1 u;]
, . '\ . (hi(ui)Pii - l)(ri + L hj(uj)) ( 6) 
Definition 5. A stationary policy u0 is a point at which u. = O for1 
all i. That is, where 
' o [\ o ol/ ' o hi(ui) /..- h/uj)Pij + Ri - uil (hi(ui)Pii - 1)J J 
for i = 1,2, • • •  ,n. 
ri + [ h/ur )J 
13 
(7 ) 
Theorem 1. A stationary policy u0 is a Nash equilibrium when T = "'  if 
and only if u� 8 [:J!.i,;i] for all i.
Proof. The sufficiency theorem of Arrow and Kurz ((197 0), p. 49, 
Proposition 8) states that the necessary conditions (2) - ( 5) replacing 
A.i(T) = 0 with the transversality conditions
lim A..(t) 2 0 
t --7<'> 1 
and lim A.. (th:. (t) 
t--7<'> 1 1 
0 
are also sufficient. 
Equations (2) and (4) are summarized in equation (6); equation 
(3) will be satisfied if and only if h'.1Cu?) � O; 1 1 For a stationary 
policy, equation ( 5) implies x.(t) = exp{-u?tJ, so x.(0) = 1 and 1 1 1 
xi(t) 2 0 for all t. We need only verify the new transversality
conditions to conclude sufficiency of u?, given Cu?>.�- · The new 1 J Jr1 
transversality conditions are 
and 
-r.t 1 0 , 0 , 0 lim e ( fl  exp{-u.t} )(h.(u.)P .. - l)/h.(u.) 2 0
t �"' j#i J 1 1 11 1 1 
-r.t 1 0 , 0 , 0 lim e Cflexp{-u.t} )(h.(u.)P .. - l)/h.(u.) = O. 
t --7<'> j J 1 1 11 1 1 
These are true for any stationary policy. But by Lemma 3 ,
A..(t) � 0, so that lim A..(t) 2 0 implies that A..(t) 2 0 for all t. 1 t �.., 1 1 
From equation (2), this means that h'.Cu?)P .. 2 1, or alternatively, 1 1 11 
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0 ui � ui • Thus if u? 8 [u.,;.], then u? is a best response to Cu?>.�- · 1 -1 1 1 J 11'" J 
If this is true for all i, then u0 is a Nash equilibrium. 
Q.E. D. 
To see directly why no stationary policy with u? > i. can be 1 1 
an equilibrium, note that in this event equation ( 6) implies that 
But 
L hjCu_j >Pij + Ri - u� < O. J 
1 0 "' 1 0 0 . J -r.t V Cu ) = 0 e [� hj(uj)Pij + Ri - ui]dt < O. 
Thus if h'.Cu?)P .. < 1, then u? is dominated by the strategy u. • O. 1 1 11 1 1 
Corollarv 1. In a stationary equilibrium, 1 -F.(t) = exp{-hCu?)t} . 1 1 
That is, in equilibrium, the cumulative distribution function of the 
ith firm's success date is exponential. Thus the convenient
assumption of an exponentially distributed success date (with the 
param eter the decision variable), which is used virtually throughout 
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the literature on research and development, is in fact correct when 
the firms face an infinite horizon, a stationary enviroJ11Dent and a 
hazard function which depends only on current investment. 
Theorem 2. Suppose u0 is a stationary Nash equilibrium policy. 
Suppose hi• h, ri • r, Pii • P, Pij • 0, (j # i).
implies u? < u?. 
1 J 
Tb.en Ri > Rj 
This is the case of identical firms and perfect patent 
protection, the case most commonly examined. We have generalized it 
somewhat to examine the impact of current monopoly power upon 
incentives to invest in R and D. Our conclusion is that, when ranked 
in increasing order by current profits, firms' investment levels in 
innovative activity follow exactly the reverse order. 
Proof. First recall that at a stationary equilibrium u? € [u.,";;:.] for 1 -1 1 
all i. If hi• h, Pii a P, then .:gi a .:g and ui au.
for all i. Define 
gi(ui) h'(u.)(h(u.)P + R. - u.)/ (h'(u.)P -
1)1 1 1 1 1 
- h'(u?)(h(u?)P + R. - u?)/ (h'(u?)P - 1) J J J J J 
Note that g.(u?> = 0 by equation (7) . 1 1 
Thus u? e [u,u] 1 -
, • , 2
g.(u.) = h'(u.) - h (u.)(h(u.)P + R. - u.)/ (h'(u.)P - 1) • 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Recall that h00(u.) i 0 for all u. E [u,;]. In addition, 1 1 -
h(u.)P + R. - u. 2 0 for all 1 1 1 ui E [.J!,;]. To see this, note that
16 
Ri 2 .J! by Assumption 3. Moreover, h'(ui)P -
1 2 0 for all ui 6 [.J!,;],
so h(u.)P + R. - u. is nondecreasing on [u,;]. Thus g'.(u.) > 0 on 1 1 1 - 1 1 
[.J!,;]. Since g. (u?) 1 J h'(u?)(R. - R.)/ (h'(u?)P -
1) ) 0, it follows J 1 J J 
that u? < u?. 
v. 
1 J 
Phase Diagram matic Analysis 
Q.E.D. 
By specializing our analysis to the case of n = 2, we can 
examine the nonstationary equilibrium (for finite T) in detail. We 
will be particularly interested in the behavior of the Nash 
equilibrium investment paths over time. Since equation (6) is 
independent of the state variables, we can graph the loci 
{(ul•Uz)lui = 0} , i = 1,2, in the control space. For simplicity, we
focus upon the two special cases: 
A) 
B) 
perfect patent protection: Pii pi. p ij = 0 • j # i
immediate imitation: P .. 1J P for all i,j. 
Recall that 
. 
sgn ui sgn {hi(ui)(hi(ui)Pii + hj(uj)Pij + Ri - ui)
- (h� (ui)Pii - l)(ri + hi(ul) + �(�))}
The equation u1 0 implicitly defines Uz as a function of 
u1: � = a(u1). 
Case A, Solving u1 = 0 for 11iCaCu1)) yields 
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h2CaCu1)) = [r1 + h.iCu1) + �Cu1><Ri - u1 - r1P1>]/ Ch'1Cu1)P1 -
1) (8)
This may sometimes be a negative number; extend the function 
hiCu2) linearly for negative numbers: 
h2CUz) = 11iCO) + �(O)Cu2 - 0) = �(O)u2,
While the equilibrium paths cannot specify negative investment 
rates, we can consider them for the purposes of the phase diagram . 
Differentiating the equation � = 0 totally, and solving for 
du2/ du1 yields 
a'Cu1) = �'cu1>[� - u1 - r1P1 - hi(a)P1]/ �Ca>C�Cu1)P1 - 1). (9)
Substituting h2(a) from equation (8) into equation (9) yields 
I I I I I 2
a Cul) =hi (u1>[u1 - Ri - hi(ul)P1]/ hi(a)(h.i(ul)Pl -
1) • 
- -
Lemma 5, There exists a unique value u1 E (u1,m) such that 
u1 - Ri -hiCu1)P1 � ( 2 ) 0 as u1 � ( 2 )u1, 
Proof. u1 - Ri - hiCu1)P1 � 0 if and only if hiCu1)P1 + Ri - u1 2 O. 
If u1 E [O, .J!.i], then h1Cu1)P1 + Ri - u1 > 0 since� 2 .!!:.i by 
Assumption 3 ,  If u1 E [.J!.1, u1], since h1 is concave on this region, 
18
h.iCu1) 2 h1(:!!]_) + �Cu1)Cu1 -:!!]_) 
Thus 
hl(ul)Pl + Ri - ul 
2 hl(.J!.l)Pl + �(ul)ulPl - �(u1>.!!:.1P1 + .!!:.1 - ul 
' = h.i<.!!:.1>P1 + Ch.i(ul)Pl - l)(ul - .!!:.i) ) 0,
since h�Cu1)P1 -12 0 and u1 -.J!.i 2 0 for u1 E [.J!.1,�], Finally, 
consider u1 E (�1, m), We know h.iC;1)P1 + Ri -�) 0 by the argument 
above; lim h.iCu1)P1 + Ri - u1 = -m, while h1Cu1)P1 + Ri - u1 is 
�� 
continuous and monotonically declining in u1 for � E Cu1, m), 
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a value u1 E (u1, m) 
- -
such that h1(�)P1 + Ri - � = O. Monotonicity and the arguments 
above imply that u1 is unique and hiCu1)P1 + Ri - u 2 (i)O as 
u1 i (2) u1• 
Q, E. D, 
We can now characterize the curve u2 = a(u1), The expression 
a'Cu1) undergoes several sign changes on [0, m], 
For u1 E [O, .J!.i), a1Cu1) < 0 with a
1
(.J!.i) = O. For
' u1 E C.!!:.1, u1>. a Cu1> > o with a vertical asymptote at �· For
u1 S Cu1,�), a
'Cu1) > 0 with a
'
c;1) = O. Finally, for
u1 S (�,m),a1Cu1) < O. In addition, one can compute hi(a(O)) and
lim �(a(u1)), using equation (8) . 
ul.+<> 
sgn h2(a(O)) sgn{r1 + �(0)(1)_ - r1P1)J
and 
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lim hi(a(u1)) 
ul-+<> 
r1 + �Cu1) - �Cu1)u1 + �Cu1)C� - r1P1)
lim , < O. 
u1 .+<> 
�Cu1)P1 - 1
Above the curve �= 0, u1 is decreasing if u1 S [O,u1), and
increasing if u1 S Cu1,m). This is illustrated in Figure 1 • 
. 
Similarly, the equation u2 = O implicitly defines u1 as a
function of u2 : u1 = P<nz>. with 
� CPCu2» [r2 + hi<nz> + �Cu2><Rz - Uz - r2P2>]/c�<u2>P2 - 1),(10) 
and 
p
, 
(u2) = �' (u2) [Rz - r2P2 - ul - � (p)Pz]/� (p)(� (u2>P2 - 1). (11)
Substituting h1Cp(�)) from above (again extending h1 by 
h1Cu1) = �(0)u1 for negative u1) yields 
I I I I I 2 
P Cu2) =hi Cu2>[u2 - Hz - �Cu2)P2]/�Cp)(�(u2)P2 - 1) • (12) 
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The analysis of this curve u1 = PC�) parallels that of the 
curve u2 = aCu1). Combining these two analyses yields the completed 
phase diagram in Figure 2. 
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* -
Recall that along any Nash equilibrium path, ui E [J!.i,ui] for
all t. Thus only the portion of Figure 2 excerpted below in Figure 3 
is relevant for the characterization of the equilibrium paths. For 
the nonstationary (finite horizon) case, the only region which can 
contain the Nash equilibrium paths is the shaded region in Figure 3. 
* - * -
This is because ui(t) < ui for t< T and ui(T) 
= ui. No paths
beginning in another region can reach (u1,Uz> from below. The point b 
is a stationary Nash equilibrium policy. 
Theorem 3. For the game with perfect patent protection, any Nash 
equilibrium strategy u�(•) must be monotonically increasing over time 
1 
(for T < "'). 
Thus firms will invest so that the conditional density of 
success� the hazard rate h.(u�(")) � is an increasing function of1 1 
time. That is, given no success to date, firm i will be increasingly 
likely to succeed in the next time increment dt as the current date t 
increases. 
There !!!AI: be multiple stationary points, as in Figure 4. A 
sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the stationary point is 
that a'(u1) ) 1 and �'(Uz) ) 1 on CJ!.i·�] X C:!!:z•Uz]. Then if there
exists a stationary point u0 e [J!.1,�] X C:!!:z,;,_1, it will be unique.
This is because the function u1 - �(a(u1)) is monotonically decreasing 
on CJ!.i.�1. 
-
-
-
-
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Case B. P .. = P for all i, j. 1J Then solving � = 0 for Uz as a 
function of u1 : u2 = aCu1). 
�(a(u1)) = - r1 - bi.Cu1) + �Cu1)(Pr1 - Ri + u1). 
Again sgn a(O) = sgn{h�(O)(Pr1 - Bi> - r1} and 
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lim �(a(u1)) < O. Differentiating the equation u1 = 0 and solving 
ul-+r> 
for du2/du1 implies 
a'Cu1) = �'<u1)(r1P - Ri + u1)/�(a(u1)).
This expression changes sign only once, at .J!i. First 
a' Cu1) > 0, then a' ( u1) < 0 for ul e (E:,1,m). Above the locus u1 = 0, 
u1 is increasing; below it, decreasing. Similarly, the equation 
Uz = O implicitly defines u1 = P<nz>. with 
hl <P<nz» r2 - bi(Uz) u �(u2) (Pr2 - Rz + Uz) 
and 
P'(u2) = �'<u2)(Pr2 -Rz + nz>/�(p(u2)).
Lemma 6. �(a(�)) ( 0. 
Proof. 
�(a(u1)) 
- 1 
rl -�(ul) + p(Prl - Ri + ul)
�(�) - <Iti - �)/P 
[- �(;1)P - 1ti + �l/P 
In the proof of Lemma 5 we established that hiCu1)P + Ri - � > O. 
Thus -� (�)P -Ri + u1 < O. 
Q. E. D. 
The phase diagram summarizing these results is in Figure 5.
Now equilibrium paths may begin in either region contained in the 
27 
dotted-line box. Thus at most one equilibrium path can decline over 
time, and then only initially. Eventually, both are increasing 
functions of time. Neither point a,b nor c is a stationary Nash 
equilibrium policy (for T = m); point d is a stationary Nash 
equilibrium policy. If firms are identical and the equilibrium is 
symmetric (that is, u� (t) = u�(t) for all t), then both firms must 1 J 
invest at an increasing rate throughout [0,T]. 
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VI. Conclusion 
We have presented a model of investment in research and 
development which generalizes previous work in this area. The 
qualitative properties of the equilibrium investment rates are similar 
to those discovered in this earlier research; that is, firms invest at 
an increasing rate over time when patent protection is perfect, or in 
symmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the assumption which is 
responsible for this monotonicity is that the hazard function depends 
only upon the current investment rate. Thus relaxation of this 
assumption seems the most important (albeit the most difficult) 
direction for subsequent investigation to take. 
By including the possibility that firms are currently active 
in the market for a substitute product, we were able to determine 
that, in a stationary equilibrium, firms with higher current revenues 
will invest at lower rates than firms with relatively lower current 
revenues (assuming that the firms are alike in all other respects). 
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